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The speed and extent of diﬀusion of behaviors in social networks depends on network structure
and individual preferences. The contribution of the present study is twofold. First, we introduce
weighted interactions between potential adopters that depend on the similarity in their preferences
and moderate the strength of social reinforcement. The reason for the extension is the existence
of a conﬁrmation bias in the way agents treat information by prioritizing evidence conforming to
their opinion. As a result, individuals become less likely to be inﬂuenced by peers with relatively
diﬀerent preferences, reducing the overall diﬀusion rate under clustered networks. Second, we en-
rich our analysis by also considering a scale free network topology with a high degree asymmetry,
motivated by its pervasiveness in online social networks. This network performs consistently well in
terms of diﬀusion for diﬀerent parameter combinations and clearly outperforms clustered networks
under weighted interactions. Our results show that more realistic assumptions regarding agents'
interactions shift the focus from clustering to degree distribution in the study of network structures
allowing for fast and widespread behavior adoption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Individual decision-making is sensitive to conspicuous
peer behavior. This has been conﬁrmed, among others,
for energy consumption choices [1, 2], adoption of solar
panels [3] and greenhouse gas mitigation practices (in-
cluding usage of public transport and recycling, see [4]).
Social inﬂuence is often the result of descriptive norms,
i.e. a regularity in the behavioral pattern of peers that
signals a socially 'correct' behavior [5]. The adoption of
such behaviors is triggered by the percolation process 
only those agents can adopt that are exposed to peers
that already adopted the behavior  and by the social
reinforcement process  every further peer increases the
likelihood of adoption.
Many studies have modeled the diﬀusion of a behav-
ior at the individual level in an explicit social network
searching for a topology ensuring fast and widespread
adoption [6, 7]. The main topological features investi-
gated are the average path length (average number of
edges along the shortest path between any two nodes)
and the clustering (the extent to which peers of any node
tend to be also peers with each other) of the network [8].
Shorter average path length allows for a faster spreading
of information. High clustering enhances a local diﬀu-
sion via the social reinforcement process. The role of
clustering has been demonstrated in an experiment by
Centola [7] where participants faced the decision to join
a health forum. Every time a participant registered to
the forum, a message was sent to her social neighbor-
hood inviting the recipients to join as well. This study
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found that participants were more likely to join as the
number of invitations they received grew, demonstrating
the role of social reinforcement. Furthermore, exploring
diﬀerent network topologies Centola concluded that be-
haviors subject to social reinforcement diﬀuse at a higher
rate in clustered networks. Several modeling studies re-
produced this ﬁnding. [9] build a simple model of infor-
mation diﬀusion where the likelihood of accepting and
transmitting the information increases with the number
of signals received. [10] use a threshold model, in which
agents adopt a behavior depending on peer pressure and
individual preferences deﬁned as intrinsic cost to adopt
a new behavior.
We introduce two novelties to the model by [10]. First,
we consider that the peer pressure between two agents de-
pends on the similarity in their preferences. Second, we
include the scale free network topology in our analysis.
Both novelties are motivated by extensive empirical ev-
idence documenting relevance of these assumptions. In
particular, as demonstrated by [11], agents put a higher
weight on opinions that conform to their existing beliefs,
pointing out an important conﬁrmation bias in the way
agents treat information. Later the conﬁrmation bias
was demonstrated in diﬀerent contexts [1214], with ex-
periments showing that agents are more likely to comply
with a norm communicated by a peer with similar prefer-
ences [15]. To model the conﬁrmation bias, we introduce
weighted edges based on the distance in agents' prefer-
ences. In other words, the social inﬂuence one agent
exerts on another is not binary (signal the behavior or
not), but mediated by their similarity in preference to-
wards adopting that behavior. Our conjecture is that this
bias can aﬀect the performance of the studied networks
in terms of diﬀusion rates. Including the scale free net-
work is motivated by the increasing empirical evidence
2that online networks exhibit the power law degree distri-
bution [16, 17], while interactions occur with ever greater
extent online [18]. This particular topology is the result
of the preferential attachment process where few nodes
have a very large number of connections, and majority
of nodes have very few peers only [19]. While simple
diﬀusion in the scale free network have been studied by
[20, 21], this paper is the ﬁrst addressing the scale free
topology for complex diﬀusion with social reinforcement
and weighted interactions.
We demonstrate that, ﬁrst, the addition of insights
from behavioral science on how agents asymmetrically
treat information undermines the performance of clus-
tered networks. This is because the long average paths
between nodes in the network allow individuals to re-
sist social pressure from peers with very diﬀerent prefer-
ences precluding further spreading of the behavior. Sec-
ond, we show that the scale free network is robust to
the weighting of interactions. It best ensures fast and
widespread diﬀusion under social reinforcement and con-
ﬁrmation bias when the majority of the population has
a high resistance against adopting the behavior. These
two results are novel and important for the literature
in understanding the complex processes of social diﬀu-
sion shifting the focus from network clustering to net-
work degree distribution as the critical factor for behav-
ior spreading. They also suggest that the diﬀusion of a
behavior is more eﬀective on digital social platforms than
on spatial oine networks where high degree asymmetry
is less likely.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes our model of diﬀusion with social re-
inforcement under conﬁrmation bias. There we introduce
weighted interactions and the scale free network topology
not considered in this context earlier. Section 3 presents
simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Percolation with social reinforcement
We describe a simple model of behavior adoption with
social reinforcement and conﬁrmation bias, in which the
decision to adopt is based on personal preferences, aware-
ness about certain behavior (percolation model) and peer
pressure. Following [10], we consider agents interacting
in a ﬁxed undirected social network N , where the set of
agent i's neighbors is denoted by Ni and its degree by
ni.
1 The agent decides to adopt the behavior if and only
if:
Q ≥ mi,t (1)
1 Upper case letters denote sets, and the corresponding lower case
letters the cardinality of the respective sets.
where Q ∈ [0, 1] is the quality of the behavior and mi,t
is the minimum quality requirement (or MQR) of agent
i.2 A zero quality means a completely unattractive be-
havior that no one is willing to adopt, while a quality
of one means a behavior that everybody wants to adopt
from the moment they are informed about it. The mini-
mum quality requirement without conﬁrmation bias is a
decreasing function of the number of adopting peers:
mi,t = pii × (gi,t)−γ (2)
with γ ∈ [0, 1] capturing the intensity of social reinforce-
ment in the decision-making, Gi,t ⊆ Ni being the subset
of adopters among agent i's peers at time t, gi,t ≤ ni
being the number of adopters among agent i's peers at
time t, and pii ∈ [0, 1] being the intrinsic switching cost of
agent i towards a given behavior. The switching costs are
inversely related to intrinsic preferences in adopting the
new behavior. An agent with high switching cost may
adopt only if several peers inﬂuence her to do so. An
agent with low switching costs will adopt as soon as one
peer signals her the behavior. In the following, we will
interchangeably refer to preferences and switching costs
that both capture the individual resistance in adopting a
certain behavior (MQR). Heterogeneous switching costs
between agents can be explained by diﬀerences in income,
education, environmental concern, available infrastruc-
ture and even amount of free time to adopt the new
behavior.3 In line with [10], we assume that switching
costs between neighbors are independent. This means
that the generating process of the network is unrelated
to the particular behavior in question. The preferences
follow a Beta distribution: pii ∼ B(β1, β2). This dis-
tribution family is ﬂexible, allowing us to study several
settings (Figure 1):
(i) a uniform distribution with β1 = 1, β2 = 1,
(ii) a pseudo-normal distribution with β1 = 4, β2 = 4,
(iii) a right skewed distribution (the majority of agents
have strong preference for the behavior) with β1 =
1, β2 = 4,
(iv) a left skewed distribution (the majority of agents
have strong preference against the behavior) with
β1 = 4, β2 = 1.
2 Quality is an abstract aggregate term. Referring to the examples
from the introduction, quality captures the eﬀectiveness of mea-
sures mitigating greenhouse gas emissions or technical quality of
solar panels. Instead of quality, one can also operate with prices:
Q as a market price andMQR as a reservation price of the agent
[22]. Considering the more expensive electricity from the renew-
able energy sources as a new behavior, social reinforcement raises
the agent's willingness to pay and adopt the new behavior.
3 Consider, for example, the choice to adopt waste sorting be-
havior where the above-mentioned characteristics can serve as
arguments in favor of or against adopting the new norm.
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FIG. 1. Diﬀerent distributions of switching costs (pii).
In the rest of the paper, we will focus on the results for
the latter speciﬁcation of the Beta distribution (pii drawn
for the B(4, 1) with the majority of people having high
switching costs. This setting corresponds best to the case
where social reinforcement makes a diﬀerence with many
agents adopting because of social pressure [10].4
While network position (and the resulting number of
adopters in the neighborhood) and switching costs are
heterogeneous across agents, other parameters like the
intensity of social reinforcement and behavior quality, act
uniformly for all agents.
Weighted interactions and conﬁrmation bias
The ﬁrst novelty of our approach is to diﬀerentiate the
inﬂuence of peers on the agent's decision to adopt de-
pending on the distance in their preferences. In doing so,
we follow the literature on the conﬁrmation bias show-
ing that opinion dynamics between two agents depends
on their opinion proximity [2325]. The bias arises due
to often unconscious selectivity in searching, interpreting
and remembering evidence supporting one's own opinion.
In this framework, agents assign more weight to opinions
that already conform to their beliefs, while neglecting to
gather, or discounting, evidence that would tell against
it [13, p.175]. While [26] captures this bias by allow-
ing agents to regard only those peers who are suﬃciently
close in their opinion, we follow [27] by allowing agents
being both close and far in their intrinsic preference to
aﬀect their peers' decision but with diﬀerent weights. For
instance, observing someone having the same preference
adopting certain behavior is more persuasive than ob-
serving someone with a very distant preference. By doing
this, we introduce heterogeneity in terms of peer pressure
the agent can experience from diﬀerent neighbors. Also,
4 The results for other distributions can be found in Appendix C.
we extend the social interaction process underlying our
model. While in [10] it was only about sharing infor-
mation about adoption decision (showing), here we as-
sume agents know and diﬀerentiate between preferences
of their peers (i.e. telling information about the reasons
behind their adoption) [28].
We proceed by extending MQR with the conﬁrmation
bias as follows:
mi,t = pii ×
(∑
j∈Gi,t e
−ρ|pii−pij |∑
k∈Ni e
−ρ|pii−pik| × ni
)−γ
(3)
with ρ ∈ [0,+∞) being the strength of conﬁrmation bias,
Ni being the set of peers of agent i, Gi,t ⊆ Ni being its
subset that adopted the behavior at time t and ni the de-
gree of agent i. The strength of the signal ﬂowing from
agent j to agent i is e−ρ|pii−pij |. The ratio in Eq.(3) repre-
sents the relative weight of the signal from the adopting
peers. We multiply this ratio by the agent's degree ni so
that Eq. (2) without conﬁrmation bias proposed by [10]
can be seen as a special case of our Eq.(3) with ρ = 0.
Furthermore, MQR of agent i would be the same in both
models if agent i is surrounded by agents with the same
preference (Eq. 4):
mi,t = pii ×
(
gi,t
ni
× ni
)−γ
= pii × (gi,t)−γ if ∀pik = pii
(4)
or if all peers of agent i adopted the behavior (Eq. 5):
mi,t = pii × (1× gi,t)−γ if gi,t = ni. (5)
Thus, introducing the conﬁrmation bias we eﬀectively
transform our network from an unweighted to a weighted
one.
Note that MQR with conﬁrmation bias from Eq.(3)
being a function f(pii, gi,t, γ) can exceed the original
switching cost pii if the distance in switching costs to
the adopters in agent i's neighborhood is larger than the
average distance to all his neighbors:∑
j∈Gi,t
e−ρ|pii−pij | ≤
∑
k∈Ni e
−ρ|pii−pik|
ni
. (6)
That means f(pii, 1, γ) = pii does not always hold any-
more (unlike in [10]), but f can be larger or smaller than
pii depending on the distance in preference to the ﬁrst
adopting peer.5 One should, however, not mix it with a
possible deterring eﬀect in our model since pii is only an
ingredient of MQR. In line with the fundamental prin-
ciple of a percolation model, f(pii, 0, γ) = ∞ (an agent
cannot adopt a behavior if she is not aware of it), and
f(pii, gi,t, γ) is strictly decreasing in gi,t for γ > 0.
5 The inequality in Eq. (6) can hold even for two or more adopting
peers.
4For very large ρ, the agents only consider the decision
of their most similar neighbors. Let us consider the case
when agent l is the most similar (in terms of preference)
peer of agent i, i.e. |pii − pil| < |pii − pik| ∀k 6= l ∈ Ni.
Then:
lim
ρ→∞ e
−ρ|pii−pij | = 0 ∀j ∈ Ni (7)
and
lim
ρ→∞
(
e−ρ|pii−pil| + e−ρ|pii−pik|
)
= e−ρ|pii−pil|. (8)
Therefore, for the strength of the conﬁrmation bias ap-
proaching inﬁnity, we have agents simplifying the behav-
ior of their whole ego network to the behavior of their
closest peer:
mi,t =
{
pii × (ni)−γ if l ∈ Gi,t
0 else.
(9)
Network topology
Our second novelty is that we extend the set of net-
works considered with the scale free network. The reason
is that many empirical networks present a very high de-
gree asymmetry. This holds particularly true for digital
social networks due to the lower time constraint asso-
ciated with maintaining online communication allowing
agents to have a very large number of connections [17].
As a result, few star agents can have a high number of
peers, whereas the majority of agents have a few con-
nections only. We generate the network using the pref-
erential attachment algorithm [19]. The probability that
an agent has k connections in the network decays as a
power law: P (k) ∼ k−α. The algorithm generates degree
distribution with α = 3 following empirical estimations
[16, 30, 31]. Comparing our results with Tur et al. [10],
we use the Watts-Strogatz algorithm [29] that starts with
generating a network in which agents are connected to a
few nearest neighbors (regular lattice), and rewires ev-
ery link with a probability µ. As the probability goes to
1, the topology resembles the random network. The so-
called small world network topology with still high clus-
tering (similar to regular lattice) but already low enough
average path length (similar to random network) is ob-
served for µ ∈ [0.001, 0.1] (see Table I). In the following
we adopt µ = 0.05.6 The networks created with the small
world algorithm all have a relatively small degree asym-
metry and have been studied without conﬁrmation bias
[10].
While the regular lattice and random network are
mathematically convenient graphs with little empirical
6 [10] tested alternative speciﬁcation of the parameter but did not
ﬁnd any qualitative diﬀerence. We also checked diﬀerent µ for
the small world network in our model with conﬁrmation bias and
came to the same conclusion.
evidence, small world and scale free topologies represent
structural properties of networks resulting from physical
and digital interactions in the real world. In particular,
small world property is typical for professional networks
(movie actors, scientiﬁc collaborations [30] and frequently
used to describe interactions leading to the adoption of
home-speciﬁc goods  such as solar PV in [32], while scale
free networks are more suited to study information dif-
fusion in online social networks, such as in [17, 33]. We
also deliberately set the density of the synthetic networks
very low (approx. 0.0004), which is in line with empirical
estimates by [34].
TABLE I. Network characteristics for 10 000 nodes and 20
000 undirected links
Average Average Degree
clustering path length asymmetry
Regular lattice 50.00 % 1250.00 0.00
Small world 35.62 % 12.50 0.12
Random 0.04 % 6.76 0.50
Scale free 0.15 % 4.27 36.30
Note: Average clustering is measured as an average probability for
every node that any two of her neighbors are connected. Average path
length measures the average number of links required to connect two
nodes. Degree asymmetry of a network is measured by the skewness of
its degree distribution.
Figure 2 is meant to illustrate our model of diﬀu-
sion with social reinforcement with and without the con-
ﬁrmation bias. The top two panels in Figure 2 ex-
emplify the diﬀusion processes with and without con-
ﬁrmation bias in a regular lattice with Q = 0.6 and
γ = 1. The early adopter E activates her four neighbors
NE = {C,D, F,G}. Without conﬁrmation bias (Eq.2)
agent G has minimal quality requirement of: mG,1 =
0.60× ( 11)1 ≤ Q and will therefore adopt. Once two con-
nected agents have adopted in a regular lattice, it is an
immediate property of Eq.(2) that for γ = 1 the diﬀusion
will reach 100% for all Q greater than 0.5.
With conﬁrmation bias and ρ = 2 (Eq.3)
the same agent has, in contrast, a mini-
mal quality requirement of: mG,1 = 0.60 ×(
e−2×0.23
e−2×0.23+e−2×0.34+e−2×0.14+e−2×0.21 × 4
)−1
' 0.609 ≥ Q
and therefore will not adopt, which prevents the further
diﬀusion process.7 This illustrates how under conﬁrma-
tion bias agents become less likely to be inﬂuenced by
peers with very diﬀerent preferences.
The lower panel in Figure 2, in contrast, demonstrates
that in a network with high degree asymmetry the behav-
ior can spread equally well with and without conﬁrmation
bias. This is because applying Eqs.(2) and (3) leads in
this example to the same diﬀusion path with two, three
and four more adopters in subsequent periods.
7 For ρ = 1 further diﬀusion would also be prevented as mG,1 =
0.602, while for ρ = 3 its value would have been even larger and
equal to 0.618.
5FIG. 2. Example of a diﬀusion process for Q = 0.6, γ = 1, B(4, 1) in (A) a regular lattice without conﬁrmation bias (B) a
regular lattice with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 1 , (C) a network with high degree asymmetry with and without conﬁrmation bias.
Note: Scalars in parenthesis are the switching costs of each agent. Black nodes represent agents having adopted the behavior while gray nodes are
agents that are subject to adopt; red links represent the signal ﬂowing from the adopting agent to its neighbors.
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FIG. 3. Relative inﬂuence of neighbors on agent G, with
diﬀerent strength of conﬁrmation bias given the distance in
preferences (d)
Figure 3 shows how the relative inﬂuence of the neigh-
bors of agent G changes when a conﬁrmation bias is in-
troduced in the model. As noted in Eqs. (7-9), when the
strength of conﬁrmation bias increases, the most similar
(in terms of preferences) neighbor, agent H in this exam-
ple, has an overarching inﬂuence on the decision-making
of agent G.
To have a more systematic comparison of the four net-
works for a larger number of adopters, diﬀerent scenarios
of early adopters as well as alternative distributions of
preferences, we proceed with the numerical experiment
in the next section.
III. RESULTS
Consistent with [10], we simulate the diﬀusion process
in undirected networks with 10 000 agents with mean
degree of 4. The process starts with 10 random early
adopters and runs until a steady state is reached, i.e. no
new adopter is generated in any subsequent period. As
the model can generate diﬀerent outcomes depending on
the initial conditions,8 we report average results over 50
8 Three features subject to random number initialization inﬂuence
the outcome: the draw of individual switching costs, the choice
of early adopters and the topology of the network.
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FIG. 4. Adoption rate without conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 0, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0,
(B) γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 5. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 2, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
7restarts for each combination of parameters: quality Q,
intensity of social reinforcement γ, distribution of prefer-
ences B(β1, β2) and strength of conﬁrmation bias ρ. In
Appendix B we also report the period in which the dif-
fusion stops to make the potential trade-oﬀ between the
rate of adoption (i.e. the share of adopters in the popu-
lation) and the duration of the diﬀusion process explicit.
We compare the four networks with the two speciﬁcations
of MQR presented in Section II: without conﬁrmation
bias described in Eq.(2) and with conﬁrmation bias from
Eq.(3) with ρ = 2. This value of ρ corresponds to a mod-
erate conﬁrmation bias (see Figure 3). In this setting,
agents with relatively dissimilar preferences have a lower
but still substantial inﬂuence on each other. Simulations
results for other values of ρ can be found in Appendix A.
In line with the description of our model, the higher
quality Q and the intensity of social reinforcement γ con-
sistently contribute to the rising rate of diﬀusion of be-
havior all else being equal. While higher Q -capturing
higher attractiveness of behavior- simply increases the
chance to adopt under the threshold rule in Eq. (1), the
higher γ does the same by increasing the role of social
reinforcement on potential adopters.
From Figure 4 we see that without any conﬁrmation
bias when the majority of the population has strong pref-
erences against adopting the behavior, the scale free net-
work performs well, reaching a diﬀusion rate higher or
equal to other networks for the majority of combinations
of quality and strength of social reinforcement without
conﬁrmation bias. The only exception is the interme-
diate level of quality (0.6-0.8) combined with the high
intensity of social interaction (γ ≥ 0.6). Note that in line
with our illustration in Figure 2, 100% diﬀusion rate in
the regular lattice is assured for certain combinations of
Q and γ. This result is trivial considering the perfectly
structured topology of the regular lattice where any two
peers share two more peers in common. According to
Eqs. (1-2), if 12γ ≤ Q then the presence of two connected
adopters is a suﬃcient condition to reach 100% diﬀusion.
One can compare this with the domino chain reaction,
where agents cannot resist social pressure from a cer-
tain point. In particular, having two connected adopters
guarantees a full diﬀusion for γ=1 under Q ≥ 0.5; for
γ=0.8 under Q ≥ 0.575; γ=0.6 under Q ≥ 0.66; γ=0.4
under Q ≥ 0.758; etc.
Once we introduce the conﬁrmation bias in Figure 5,
we observe a deterioration of the rate of diﬀusion in the
regular lattice while performance of all other networks,
particularly the scale free one, remains remarkably ro-
bust. This is made clear by Figure 6, which shows the
change in adoption rate when conﬁrmation bias is in-
troduced. This deterioration happens because the bias
raises the propensity of agents to resist social pressure
from peers with relatively diﬀerent preferences. Hence,
the domino eﬀect described in the regular lattice under
no conﬁrmation bias arises only for much higher values of
Q. For larger ρ, there is no threshold quality such that
100% diﬀusion rate in the regular lattice is guaranteed
(see Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix A). Combined with the
fact that a few resisting agents are suﬃcient to isolate
a large share of the network from early adopters (Figure
2), we observe the very high fragility of the performance
of the highly clustered network towards presence of the
conﬁrmation bias. It is worth mentioning that already
few short path links present in the small world network
solve the problem and make the network robust to the
bias. Thanks to those links, agents bypass the resisting
nodes and eﬀectively prevent them from stopping further
diﬀusion. Increasing further the number of adopters later
can convert the resisting agent into an adopter anyway.
To check the robustness of this result, we explore al-
ternative values of the conﬁrmation bias strength ρ (see
Appendix A). We ﬁnd that the performance of the reg-
ular lattice deteriorates even further when the similarity
in preferences plays a stronger role in the diﬀusion pro-
cess. For higher value of ρ, we ﬁnd that the adoption rate
in the regular lattice is close to 0 for virtually all combi-
nations of parameters. This conﬁrms that the diﬀusion
process in clustered networks is highly contingent on the
weight agents assign to similar peers.
Another important consequence of the introduction of
the conﬁrmation bias is the fact that the scale free net-
work becomes the best performing graph in terms of
diﬀusion for virtually all combinations of quality and
strength of social interaction (Figure 5). Thus, unlike
previous studies, we ﬁnd that high clustering is not nec-
essary to reach high diﬀusion rates when the majority
of agents originally resists the adoption. The most con-
nected agents in the scale free network act like inﬂu-
ence hubs: they are more likely to have early adopters
among neighbors (hence, adopt the behavior themselves),
and subsequently distribute the signal to their numerous
peers quickly increasing the strength of social pressure on
other agents. Unlike clustering, this structural property
is not sensitive to the introduction of weighted interac-
tions. Although describing the important role of inﬂu-
ence hubs is not novel in the case of simple diﬀusion, the
presence of high degree asymmetry allows for a broad and
fast diﬀusion under social reinforcement even with a low
clustering and conﬁrmation bias.
Comparing diﬀusion across networks in terms of speed
(number of periods until diﬀusion stops) supports the ad-
vantage of the scale free network. Thus, it does not only
reach highest diﬀusion rates, but does so in the shortest
number of periods (see Appendix B). The latter is impor-
tant if one is concerned not just with the ﬁnal outcome
but also the speed of its realization. A good example
can again be environmental behavior: a quick diﬀusion
would help to reduce CO2 emissions early enough to pre-
vent global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels
[35]. Other network topologies, whenever they reach rel-
atively high diﬀusion rates, take much more time. This
is particular true for the regular lattice. Taking its very
long average path length (Table I), however, this is not
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FIG. 6. Diﬀerence in percentage points between the adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 2, and without conﬁrmation
bias, ρ = 0, for pi ∼ B(4, 1) (A) regular, (B) small world, (C) random, and (D) scale free.
Note: Negative values mean that the adoption rate is lower under conﬁrmation bias. The results are generated for diﬀerent combinations of Quality
and intensity of social reinforcement (γ).
surprising.9
We also test the model under alternative distributions
of preferences like the uniform distribution or majority of
agents having low switching costs (see Appendix C). In
those cases the scale free network does not always rank
ﬁrst, but is only slightly inferior to the best performing
network.
IV. CONCLUSION
The mounting empirical evidence on the role of social
interaction in aﬀecting individual decision-making and
behavior spreading has drawn attention to the search of
network topology that best promotes the diﬀusion pro-
cess, both in terms of adoption rate and the amount of
time needed. Earlier, the literature demonstrated that
clustered networks best foster diﬀusion if a majority of
agents is resistant to adopt. This is because the seem-
ingly redundant ties reinforce the probability of adop-
tion of the most resisting agents. If, in contrast, agents
9 Note that the curves of diﬀusion times for diﬀerent Q resemble an
inverted U shape. This is because for greater Q agents are more
likely to adopt without any social reinforcement. In fact, for Q→
1 any agent adopts once he has one peer among adopters. Hence,
the speed of diﬀusion for Q → 1 is increasing. Low diﬀusion
time for Q → 0, in turn, is due to the low diﬀusion rates where
behavior spreading stops early in time.
are open to adopting new behavior, networks with short-
est paths are good enough to reach high diﬀusion rates
within a short amount of time.
The present paper makes the setting studied by [10]
more realistic by diﬀerentiating the inﬂuence of peers on
the agent's decision to adopt depending on the distance in
their preferences. In doing so, we follow the experimental
evidence that people put a higher weight on opinions that
conform to their beliefs  the so-called conﬁrmation bias.
Furthermore, accepting the growing role of online social
networks and their highly asymmetric degree distribution
exhibiting power law, we add the scale free topology in
our network comparison.
We demonstrate that the introduction of the bias
changes the ranking of networks in terms of the diﬀu-
sion rates they achieve. In particular, while the regular
lattice was performing best when the majority of agents
have a strong preference against adopting the behavior, it
becomes last once agents start diﬀerentiating their neigh-
bors based on the distance in their preferences and, con-
sequently, resist the adoption. Such a fragility is due to
the absence of short paths between agents allowing to
bypass the resisting nodes. In contrast, other studied
networks, and particularly the scale free one, are robust
to the introduction of this assumption to the model. The
scale free network becomes the best performing one under
such a setting in terms of diﬀusion for diﬀerent intensities
of social reinforcement. Unlike the existing literature, we
ﬁnd that high clustering is not necessary to explain high
diﬀusion rates when the majority of agents is reluctant
9to adopt. This is because high degree nodes serve as in-
ﬂuence hubs collecting and redistributing the signal of
a new behavior raising social pressure in the network.
Thus, our results shift the focus from network cluster-
ing to network degree distribution as the key factor for
diﬀusion. As highly asymmetric networks are pervasive
in digital social platforms, our results suggest that a dif-
fusion will be more eﬀective in those platforms than in
spatial oine networks characterized by higher clustering
and lower degree asymmetry.
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Appendix A RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT CONFIRMATION BIAS PARAMETERS
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FIG. 7. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 1, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
regular
small world
random
scale free
(A)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(B)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(C)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(D)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(E)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(F)
FIG. 8. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 3, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
11
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
regular
small world
random
scale free
(A)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(B)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(C)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(D)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(E)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Quality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Av
er
ag
e
ad
op
tio
n
ra
te
(F)
FIG. 9. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 10, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 10. Diﬀerence in percentage points between the adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 10, and without conﬁrmation
bias, ρ = 0, for pi ∼ B(4, 1) (A) regular, (B) small world, (C) random, and (D) scale free.
Note: Negative values mean that the adoption rate is lower under conﬁrmation bias. The results are generated for diﬀerent combinations of Quality
and intensity of social reinforcement (γ).
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Appendix B TIME OF DIFFUSION
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FIG. 11. Diﬀusion time without conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 0, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0,
(B) γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 12. Diﬀusion time with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 2, and for pi ∼ B(4, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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Appendix C DIFFERENT SWITCHING COSTS DISTRIBUTIONS
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FIG. 13. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 0, and for pi ∼ B(1, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 14. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 2, and for pi ∼ B(1, 1) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 15. Adoption rate without conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 0, and for pi ∼ B(4, 4) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0,
(B) γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 16. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 2, and for pi ∼ B(4, 4) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 17. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 0, and for pi ∼ B(1, 4) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
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FIG. 18. Adoption rate with conﬁrmation bias, ρ = 2, and for pi ∼ B(1, 4) with social reinforcement intensity (A) γ = 0, (B)
γ = 0.2, (C) γ = 0.4, (D) γ = 0.6, (E) γ = 0.8, and (F) γ = 1.
Note: The dashed lines represent two standard deviations around the average.
